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REFLECTIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE PLIGHT OF THE POOR IN A WORLD
WHERE NOTHING WORKS
WALTER KENDALL*

Countless articles have been written on judicial review. Some
of the best articles in the last two years are in a symposium
entitled "The Constitution and the Good Society" in the Fordham
Law Review.' Others appear in the electronic symposium on the
twenty-fifth anniversary of Owen Fiss' article Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause.2
In addition to 2003 being the 200th anniversary of Marbury v.
Madison,3 it is the 100th anniversary of the publication of W.E.B.
Du Bois's The Souls of Black Folk. Noting that coincidence
reminded me there have been two Justice Marshalls on the Court.
Initially I thought that a focus on the second Justice Marshall
would provide some forgotten views and counter-point about
judicial review and the role of the Court. Obviously it does; but
not those I anticipated. The best academic thinking about the
meaning of the Constitution, especially about the place and the
meaning of equality, has broadened and deepened the
jurisprudential views of Justice Thurgood Marshall. Work on race
and class is more fully developed. Other aspects or applications of
equal opportunity, anti-classification, and anti-subordination
principles; and welfare rights and social citizenship views have
been developed.4 And they continue to be developed through
sessions like this.
Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School. I would like to thank
my research assistants, Jennifer Irmen and Orley Moskovits. Special thanks
to Professor Samuel Olken for a critical reading of an early draft of this
article.
1. Symposium, The Constitution and the Good Society, 69 FoRDHAM L.
*

REV. 1569 (2001).

2. The Origins and Fate of Antisubordination Theory: A Symposium on
Owen Fiss's Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, Issues in Legal
Scholarship (August 2002) at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2004).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98
MICH.L. REV. 1 (1999); J.M. Balkin, The Constitutionof Status, 106 YALE L.J.
2313 (1997); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410
(1994).
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In fact, one wonders if there is anything new to be said? I
think the answer is yes. It is always "yes." Both in terms of what
Mark Tushnet called "ordinary politics," when scholarship focuses
on particular applications of current case law; and in terms of
what he called times of "constitutional transformation," when
scholarship is shaken-up;5 and even reconceptionalized as it was,
for instance, in Charles Reich's article The New Property.6
I.

THE NEW HISTORY

Significantly for understanding the role and impact of the
Supreme Court, and appreciating and evaluating the historical
aspects of the articles in this Marbury v. Madison Symposium, a
number of essays were recently published in a collection edited by
two British historians under the title Contesting Democracy,7 and
they revised the standard periodization of history textbooks. The
periods proposed will be especially unsettling to constitutional law
scholars. The titles of several of the essays and the periods are:
State Development in the Early Republic: Substance and Structure
(1780-1840); Change and Continuity in the Party Period: The
Substance and Structure of American Politics (1835-1885); The
Limits of FederalPower and Social Politics (1910-1955).
Most constitutional law casebooks are not structured
historically.'
Brest et al, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking is the major exception. Its periodization, which I
suspect is generally accepted by constitutional scholars, is
indicated by its chapter headings: The Marshall Court; The Taney
Court and the Civil War: 1835-1865; From Reconstruction to the
New Deal: 1866-1934; Constitutional Adjudication in the Modern
World.
The new periodization of the historians, raises questions
about this view and places many of the leading Supreme Court
cases in new and interesting light. For instance Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 0 McCulloch v. Maryland," and Cohen v. Virginia"

5. Oral presentation during Marbury forum at The John Marshall Law
School (Oct. 3, 2003).
6. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
7. CONTESTING DEMOCRACY: SUBSTANCE AND STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN

POLITICAL HISTORY 1775-2000 (Byron E. Shafer & Anthony J. Badger eds.,
2001) [hereinafter CONTESTING DEMOCRACY].
8. See, e.g., KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (14th ed. 2001); DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THEMES FOR
THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY (3d ed. 2003).
9. PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J. M. BALKIN, AND AKHIL REED
AMAR, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000).
10. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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are described as "a potent burst of judicial nationalism,"3 yet as a
result there was a "swing of Virginia and the South back to states'
rights [which] would constrict nation-state development as the
southern periphery continued to dominate the central government
indirectly." 4 So while McCulloch is studied as the under pinning
of an expansive reading of the Constitution, its unintended
consequence was an end to state (meaning nation-state)
development.
After the three cases mentioned are discussed in a
Constitutional Law class, a student will often ask why the
government, which obviously now had the authority to do so, did
not outlaw slavery. My answer has always been that the slave
holding states dominated the government but frankly without
concrete evidence.
Only recently has that evidence been
assembled.
Leonard Richards ascertained that between the
Constitution and the Civil War, the President was a slaveholder
for fifty years, the Speakers of the House were slave holders for
forty-six years, slaveholders were chairs of the House Ways and
Means committee for forty-eight years, and over half of the
Supreme Court Justices were from what became the Confederate

States.15
Further the three-fifths clause increased the number or seats
of the slave-holding states in the House of Representatives.
Finally, enough Northerners voted with the South on racial issues
to ensure slavery-protecting compromises."
While this all cannot be blamed on the Marshall Court, it
seems worth remembering that Marbury was still born, in the
sense that the Supreme Court did not declare another
congressional enactment unconstitutional for about fifty years;
and McCulloch apparently caused a racist backlash which despite
Marshall's almost imperial rhetoric, weakened the national
government.
Similarly cases like Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v.
Proprietorsof Warren Bridge7 and Mayor of New York v. Miln" at
one end and Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway v. Illinois 9 at
the other, appear differently in the new periodization. All three

12. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
13. Ronald P. Formisano, State Development in the Early Republic:
Substance and Structure, 1780-1840, in CONTESTING DEMOCRACY, supra note
7, at 21.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 21-22 (citing Leonard Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North
and Southern Domination 1780-1860 (2000)).

16. Id. at 22.
17. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (1 Pet.) 420 (1837).
18. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
19. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
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get scant attention in most casebooks.2 ° Yet, the cases of 1837
kept the police powers of the States alive, despite the supremacy
and commerce clauses; and Charles River Bridge made
constitutionally possible the democratic struggle against the
concentrations of power developing in the market revolution of the
early nineteenth century. Wabash, in 1886, at the other end of
this "period" marks the beginning of substantial limitations on the
regulatory authority of the States; and a tentative beginning of
federal regulation.
The 1837 Court approved continuation of state and local
control over the economy, and the market revolution of that period
helps explain why reform movements and third parties focused
primarily on control of state and local governments. The major
exception being the abolitionists and Free-Soil party in that
slavery was a truly national issue.
With Wabash, the power of state and local governments was
eviscerated. But more significantly, manifestations of private
economic power had become so big and significant that
the only
21
effective counterforce could be the national government.
To continue with examples of the new insights revisionist
periodization provides there is the infamous and short-lived case
of Hamer v. Dagenhart' and its "progeny": the equally infamous
to some, but longer-lived Griswold v. Connecticut.23
In addition to the obvious humanitarian arguments against
child labor, which continue to inspire reform efforts like the
student led anti-sweat shop, anti-Nike activities on many college
campuses, child labor raised concerns about efficiency and
expertise. The assembly line of Ford's factories and the "one best
way" of Frederick Winslow Turner 4 required, if not the "educated"
citizen of republicanism, at least a competent worker. So children
needed to be in school, not laboring in a field or factory.2
20. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 362 (11th ed. 2001) (using only a five line
mention of Miln as part of its presentation of Edwards v. California);
CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND
RECONSTRUCTION: CASES, NOTES, AND PROBLEMS (2nd ed. 2001) (having only

a four line mention of Charles River Bridge in its discussion of the contracts
clause).
21. See Michael Holt, Change and Continuity in the Party Period: The
Substance and Structure of American Politics, 1835-1885, in CONTESTING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 99-100 (describing the strength of state powers
between 1837 and 1886).
22. Hamer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24. See generally ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY-FREDERICK
WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY (1997).
25. See Richard Jensen, Democracy, Republicanism, and Efficiency: The
Values of American Politics, 1885-1930 in CONTESTING DEMOCRACY, supra
note 7, at 160 (stating the progressives' stance on child labor).
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Significant for constitutional evolution was the opposition to
child laws led by conservative women's groups like Women
Patriots in Massachusetts and the Catholic Church. They insisted
that America's ideal required a protected enclave for the family. It
was also argued that the child labor law was an attempt to
"nationalize or sovietize family life." 6
Interestingly, the first of these oppositional arguments, while
failing in its immediate task, succeeded in at least one very
important way. Griswold's privacy right is traceable back in part
to the struggle of the Catholic Church for space to leave its
theology unhindered by the state.
The second oppositional
argument proved prescient in its own way. The "best interests of
the child" rule which clearly communalizes child rearing is
grounded in the paternalistic, even Platonic, logic which is part of
the support for child labor laws.
In this period variously characterized as the Progressive era
or the fourth party period,
corruption became a sin. In political discourse, it displaced
the personal sins of intemperance and secessionism that had
bedeviled the third party system [approx. 1850-1890].
Theologically, the idea was reinforced by the Social
Gospelers, 'the praying wing of Progressivism,' who preached
the replacement of personal sin with public sin. . . The new
morality committed progressives to active intervention in
social and economic realms.27
Perhaps it is this new sense of "sin" as having a social, even
political, aspect that underlies both the passivity of the New Deal
court towards economic regulation and its activity in civil rights
and civil liberties cases.
This new periodization has the "New Deal" values revolution
actually occurring a half-century earlier than it did. And then the
Lochner court can be viewed as trapped in a pre-Fordist-preTurnerist world, where Turner's "frontier"" provided opportunity
to escape from coercive manifestations of private economic power.
I am not unaware of the debate about what Lochner, and the
entire jurisprudential era mean.29 I do not know who has the
better of the argument, but I prefer the revisionist view. In any
event, Friedman's case rests almost entirely on media reports and
political rhetoric. He fails to recognize that when Bill O'Reilly and
Al Franken "have a go at it," they are not really talking about
26. Anthony J. Badger, The Limits of Federal Power and Social Politics,
1910-1955 in CONTESTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 188.
27. Jensen, supra note 25, at 161.
28. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN

AMERICAN HISTORY (1893).

29. See Barry Freidman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty,
PartThree: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 NYU L. REV. 1383 (2001).
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what they are talking about. It might be said in response that the
media today is not representative, that the rhetoric of earlier days
was more reasonable and reliable. Not so, as many have shown.
It has always been rough out there."
While, as I said, I incline towards the revisionist view that
there is a defensible equality based dimension to the Lochner
Court's thinking, that debate is not my concern today. Rather this
introduction is to suggest that we are at a time of "transformation"
when the ruling ways of looking at things fail to explain reality.
Even long accepted periodizations and understanding of
constitutional development are unsettled.
II. THE THEME IS IN THE TITLE
Scholarship over the last half of the twentieth century has
established that none of the major structuring or ordering systems
of society work the way it should. Each "should" work in a way
that a good and just society results.
Markets, regulation,
litigation, democracy have both endogenous and exogenous
limitations. I will, in the briefest summary, outline how and why
each of these fail, as preliminary to the question I want to address,
which is the place or role of judicial review in such circumstances.
In a world where none of the big structures work as they
should people cling to the small systems that do work-like
microwave ovens and DVD's. Or they latch on to big ideologic
fundamentalisms, if that is not an oxymoron-like religion or
patriotism. For some in the legal academy formalism, 1 or for
others the "dictionary" as the source of meaning for words," are
the small means to certainty and security. For others it is big
things like law and economics" or democracy' that guide us
through these troubled times.

III. GOOD PEOPLE
Some argue that the key requirement for a good or just
society is not systems and institutions; rather it is people-good
people.
William Penn, whose experiences with the King
contributed mightily to the development of the jury, was of this

30. See JEFFREY L. PASLEY, "THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS:" NEWSPAPER
POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Univ. of Virginia Press, 2001)
(2003) (outlining the politics of the printers throughout the nineteenth
century).
31. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
32. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionariesand Statutory Interpretation, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1437 (1994).
33. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed.
1998).
34. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS (1999).
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view:
Any government is free to the people under it (whatever be the
frame) where the laws rule, and the people are a party to those
laws, and more than this is tyranny, oligarchy, or confusion. But,
lastly, when all is said, there is hardly one frame of government in
the world so ill designed by its first founders that, in good hands,
would not do well enough... Let men be good, and the government
cannot be bad; if it be ill, they will cure it. But, if men be bad, let
the government be ever so good, they will endeavor to warp and
spoil it to their turn.3 5
However, James Harrington, at about the same time argued
to the contrary:
"Give us good men, and they will make us good laws," is the maxim
of a demagogue... But "give us good orders, and they will make us
good men"
36 is the maxim of a legislator and the most infallible in the
politics.
Madison famously accepted this view as evidenced in his "If
men were angels. .. "" So let us begin to look at the imperfect
alternatives, to use Neil Komesar's suggestive phrase."
IV. MARKETS
At least since Adam Smith it has been argued that if markets
are allowed to operate the wealth and welfare of society will be
maximized. The mechanism for this is "the invisible hand."39
Assuming that property rights have been defined in ways
that internalize costs and benefits resulting from the use of a
resource, the economic perspective then focuses on facilitating the
transferability of these property rights to ensure that they end up
in the highest-valued social uses. The preconditions for successful
operation of the market include the presence of a large number of
buyers and sellers, none of whom has sufficient power to affect the
price of the goods being traded. There also has to be product
fungibility
or substitutability,
and reasonably
accurate
information available to all participants about price and quality.
Finally, there has to be substantial opportunity for competitors to

35. WILLIAM

PENN,

PREFACE

TO

FRAME

OF

GOVERNMENT

FOR

PENNSYLVANIA (1682) available at www.constitution.org/bcf/frampenn.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
36. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1656) available

at www.simonova.net/library/762-2.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 51.
38. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
39. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTSPOLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 100-13 (1977)

(describing the significance of The Wealth of Nations).
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enter the market."
The absence of any of these conditions can be called a market
failure that will reduce the likelihood of the common good being
achieved.41 Further, Von Neumann's Prisoner's Dilemma4" and
Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons' make powerful cases
that the pursuit of self-interest does not result in the public
interest or common good.
For common good to result there needs to be some law,
despite findings suggesting otherwise by Ellickson in his
important study of how neighbors settle disputes within his
schema of norms and rules. His conclusion in Order Without Law:
How Neighbors Settle Disputes was that neighbors in fact are
strongly inclined to cooperate, to be sure. But the cooperative
outcomes result not by bargaining around legal entitlements, as
Rather, they develop and
Coase's theorem" would indicate.
enforce "norms of neighborliness" that supersede formal legal
rules.
His study was of Shasta County, an area of mostly open range
where the cattle ranchers and the other residents form a close-knit
group with a lot of personal work-a-day contact with each other.
Ellickson acknowledges however that departures from these
conditions of reciprocity, the lack of adequate and shared
information and ready sanctioning opportunities will inhibit, even
prevent, the emergence of norms maximizing the common good.
Social imperfections similar to market imperfections will develop
especially in more transient, larger and less closely-knit
communities than Shasta County. 5 Thus, the law of contracts,
whose functions include containing opportunism in nonsimultaneous exchanges, reducing transaction costs, filling gaps in
incomplete contracts, and distinguishing welfare enhancing from
welfare reducing exchanges becomes necessary."
So even in its own terms the market is flawed. When the
boundedness of rationality and the finding of Kahneman and
Tversky and others are recognized it is clearer why "the market"
does not work.47

40. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 117 (1993) (describing the private ordering paradigm).

41. See generally Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:
Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 547
(1979).
42. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-11 (1984).

43. 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
44. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF L. & ECO. 1
(1960).
45. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
46. TREBILCOCK, supra note 40, at 15-17.

47. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
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V.

REGULATION

When there is a market failure what can be done? There are
several options. One could do nothing and rely on the common law
to provide a remedy for any harm. The limits of litigation are
outlined later in this paper.
Anti-trust law, government
ownership, taxation and subsidy, or economic or social regulation
are the other major options. All of these can be conflated to
"regulation."
Cass Sunstein has insightfully identified many of the
unintended consequences, even paradoxes, of regulation. He
persuasively argues and presents examples of such side effects of
otherwise curative governmental action. For instance, he shows
how requiring the best available technological fix for a problem
can actually retard technological development (the best becomes
the enemy of the good) or how "equality" can make things worse
(for example, women now pay alimony, and get less alimony than
they used to).'
Thus, the temptation for ever more and more
specific regulations which can result in what Weber called the
"iron cage" of bureaucracy.49
VI. LITIGATION

But can't we rely on litigation to regulate undesirable
behavior and remedy wrongs resulting from system failures?
Allen Kamp has identified several factors that limit the
effectiveness of litigation.' Often the harm is widespread, but too
small for an individual to sue; or the harm can be so serious that
damages are inadequate (use of thalidomide is an example).
Courts are not set up to monitor behavior over extended periods of
time; they lack the necessary expertise to deal with many
regulatory issues; and there is a high volume which would
overwhelm the resources of the courts.
The common law has built-in biases that limit its
effectiveness in dealing with new and developing problems (the
right of employees to organic and collectively bargain in the early
twentieth century was unrecognizable under common law
principles). Finally separation of powers and official immunity
insulate persons having significant impact on others from judicial
scrutiny.

Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); See generally RICHARD H.
THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMOLIES OF ECONOMIC
LIFE (First Princeton Paperback Printing, 1994) (1992).
48. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 271-97 (1997).
49. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(1904).

50. See Allen Kamp, The Multistate Consumer Class Action: Local
Solutions, NationalProblems, 87 W. VIR. L. REV. 271, 293 (1985).
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VII. DEMOCRACY

Much contemporary constitutional law theorizing has moved
from trying to understand judicial review to calling for its limit,
even elimination in a sense. Professor Mark Tushnet has offered a
powerful argument to take the Constitution away from the Court
and to return it to the people. He has moved beyond concern
about the counter-majoritarian dilemma to claims that reliance on
the electoral-legislative processes results in both a "populist"
understanding of the Constitution and a more active citizenry.5 1
Some have argued to the contrary, that the entire system of
government embedded in the Constitution is a "complex, nonmajoritarian form of self-government," of which judicial review is
only one component.
So there is no counter-majoritarian
difficulty. Rather it has been argued that judicial review is
democratic. It is not democratic in the electoral sense; but rather,
impartiality, effective choice, participation, and deliberation make
it so.2

Public choice theory has shown that at each step in the
electoral-legislative processes rational behavior results in less
than the public interest or common good. In simplified terms
people do not vote, so the elected representatives do not represent;
there is in fact no aggregation of private interests. And the
representatives do not seek the common good; rather, they seek reelection. They do this by "selling" legislation to contributors and
constituencies that support their continuation in office. 3
A century ago Robert Michels theorized that politics would be
dominated by small "rent-seeking" or what we have come to call
special interest groups.5" His findings have been confirmed in
theory and practice many times since.55
Finally, Kenneth Arrow has questioned whether the
legislative process is or can be coherent.
His Impossibility
Theorem questions whether permanent, positive change can be
brought about through voting."6

51. See TUSHNET supra note 34.

But see Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial

Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313 (2003).

52. See

Christopher

Eisgruber,

Constitutional Self-Government and

JudicialReview: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 115, 117 (2002).
53. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC

CHOICE (1991) (describing interest groups and the political process).
54. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (1915)

(1968).
55. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (distinguishing the agenda of

small groups from that of larger ones).
56. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL

VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
But see Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
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VIII.

THE BALANCING ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT

It has to be admitted that the Supreme Court has also been
subjected to the same kind of withering analysis that the other
systems and institutions have been subjected to.57 So we are
looking at just another imperfect alternative in a sense.
Nevertheless, twice in The Federalist Hamilton asserts "that
the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to
produce a good administration."'
In The Federalist No. 78 he
describes a judiciary secure in its tenure during good behavior as
"the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the
laws."' 9 He goes further in the same paper to say, "permanency in
office... may... be justly regarded as an indispensable
ingredient in [the] constitution, and, in a great measure, as the
citadel of the public justice and the public security.""
Implicit in this high view of an independent judiciary is the
notion of checks and balances. No power, governmental or private,
political, social, religious, or economic can be allowed to go
unchecked.
Much has been written on the "checking" function of the
Court. Its role as both protector of the people from the other two
branches of government, and even as protector of the Constitution
from the people, has been defended and condemned innumerable
times."' I myself have written on Madison's recognition of and
concern about private economic power, and the need for a strong
government to regulate and control it.62
Here, rather than focus on general governmental checks on
power, I want to focus on the role of the judiciary in balancing
things in the imperfect world we have described.
The balancing I am thinking about is not the balancing
frequently used by the Court in cases, both constitutional and
otherwise.'
For instance, to illustrate the routine or "internal"
balancing between or among relevant, even competing, values
used in deciding cases, one need go no further than the Mathews v.

57. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 802 (1982).
58. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 68, 76.
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 78.

60. Id.
61. "The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to
let people alone." Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.). See also Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 MICH.

L. REV. (1990).
62. Walter J. Kendall III, The Republican Revival Debate Private Economic
Power, The ForgottenFactor,16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 363 (1991).
63. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary
Reasons in ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994).
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64
Eldridge
test for determining what kind of hearing the due
process clause requires in different circumstances. The Court
weighs the private interest adversely affected by the government
action, the public or governmental interest or purpose supporting
its actions, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
individual's right because of the lack of the particular additional
procedural protection being sought.
Or one can consider the federalism context, specifically that of
the dormant commerce clause, where the Court balances the
interest of the state in enacting its regulation affecting commerce
and the significance of that effect on the national interest in the
free flow of commerce.6
Rather, the balancing I am talking of is more like the balance
of power in the international realm' or perhaps more precisely the
countervailing power concept of Galbraith.6 ' The notion is not the
checking or line drawing role of the Court in a civil liberties or
human rights case. It is more akin to the aspect of judicial review
of administrative agency rule making, where the Court remands a
rule back to the agency because the agency failed to consider or
undervalued an aspect of the situation that the proposed rule
addresses.'
As noted in passing at the beginning of this essay, various
conceptualizations of the equality embedded in the Constitution
have developed since the Brown v. Board of Education decision
put equality back at the center of constitutional debate. I want to
briefly describe each of those views and propose as an extension of
them what has been called a preferential option for the poor.
After summarily presenting arguments developed by others
that the Constitution can and should be understood as
incorporating such as view of equality, I want to offer some
thoughts on how the Supreme Court can use a balancing approach
to actualize this preferential option of the poor.

IX. EQUALITY AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR

The "preferential option for the poor" that I am suggesting is
a substantive element of the Constitution, not just an equal
64. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
65. E.g., Kassell v. Consolidation Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
66. See Elizabeth Skinner, Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice
in the 21st Century, Conference Report, McGill Univ., Center for Contemporary
Conflict (May 17-18, 2002) at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/bop/
confRept.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
67. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE
CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1980) (describing restraints on private
power as the counter-part of competition).
68. E.g., Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983).
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opportunity, or an anti-classification principle. It is even more
than an anti-subordination principle. Let me first briefly describe
each of the three things that a preferential option for the poor is
not.
Equal opportunity is usually understood to accept the
unequal state of the world and its "democratic-capitalist" systems.
It can be described as a "nightwatchmen" state with its attendant
laws to make sure the market operates and people have protection
against physical harms. Even anti-discrimination and regulatory
laws that most have come to accept, even rely on, would not be
allowed. For instance, Richard Epstein rejects even the limited
understanding of the police power adopted by the Lochner Court. 9
The anti-classification principle prohibits the government
from classifying people on the basis of forbidden categories. It
permits the government to regulate similar classifying behavior by
non-governmental actors across a wide range of human activity.
The focus is on individual persons where disputes about alleged
violations of the principle are tried before an objective or nonpartisan Court."0
Robin West, crediting Charles Black, argues that these two
notions, individuals and courts, when put together create a "very
'tight fit' between, on the one hand, the traditional, antidiscrimination understanding of equal protection, and on the
other, both judicial-institutional self understanding . . .

and

jurisprudential aspiration--'treating likes alike' is an ethical idea
at the very heart of the idea of adjudicative law."" She adds that
Courts do their "moral" work "under pre-existing law. 7 2
The anti-subordination principle as a subject of legal
scholarship has been credited to Owen Fiss' article Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause. "Anti-subordination theorists [including
Derrick Bell and Catharine MacKinnon] ...argue that law should
reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social
status of historically oppressed groups."73 The labels used in the
literature to communicate this notion resonate in the same place
as Justice Harlan's anti-caste language in his Plessy dissent, and
the concerns about "class legislation" that were common in both
69. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 109 (1985).

70. See Kathryn Abrams, "Groups" and the Advent of Critical Race
Scholarship (Fiss e-symposium, Article 10) at 1-3 (August 2002) at
http://bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl0/ (last visited Jan 26, 2004).
71. Robin West, Groups, Equal Protection and Law, (Fiss e-symposium,
Article 8) at 5 (August 2002) at http://bepress.com/ils/iss2/art8/ (last visited
Jan 26, 2004).
72. Id. at 5-6.
73. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination (Fiss e-symposium article 11) at 1
(Aug. 2002) at http://bepress.com/ils/iss2/artllI (last visited Jan 26, 2004).
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law and politics throughout the nineteenth century.74
If the three above principles are what a preferential option for
the poor is not, what is it and how does it differ from the above?
A preferential option for the poor requires asking at every
point of public policy decision making how the choices being
considered would affect people at the lower end of the economic
ladder. 75 Being poor is not a status, at least not an immutable
characteristic or an essentialism. But surely Michael Harrington
was right.76 Metaphors like web, slippery slope, invisibility, and
others, sadly including a self-inflicted wound come to mind. I use
the ladder metaphor intentionally. I want to capture within the
preferential option model among other traditional notions the
ideas of leveling up, not down; of requiring "work" to advance; and
the neutrality or impersonality of a ladder as the mechanism of
that advance.77
In more technical legal terms, the preferential option for the
poor principle requires an evaluation of all policy choices to see
their impact on poor people. If there is a disparate impact the
policy choice must be adjusted to "prefer" the poor.
Washington v. Davis's insistence that disparate impact is not
sufficient to heighten judicial concern would certainly not be good
law under the preferential option for the poor principle. Rather
that opinion would be recognized for what it is, the Plessy of the
twentieth century. 8
Some, even many, might accept such a view of the
Constitution; that there is an aspirational duty of the political
branches to strive for, even move towards "equal citizenship." But
even those sharing such a view, for a variety of reasons, often see
74. See generally HOWARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993)

(discussing class legislation). See also Samuel R. Olken, Justice George
Sutherland and Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism and the
Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1997).
75. See THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR FOR THE POOR (Richard

John Neuhaus ed., 1988) (providing a debate about the meaning of this

concept in its theologic and policy contexts).
76. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1962).
77. See Anne L. Alstott, Work v. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to
Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967 (1999). Also see Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where Justice Marshall in dissent argued in the
words of a former law clerk, that "everyone had a right to a government job
unless the government had a good reason not to give the applicant a job."
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991 at 30 (1997).
78. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896). Paradoxically, in the dormant commerce clause area the

Court finds "disparate effect" sufficient to require heightened scrutiny of state
economic legislation. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm., 432
U.S. 333 (1977).
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little or no role for the Courts. 9
To see just what role judicial review might have in this world
where nothing works, where all alternatives are imperfect, but
where there is a constitutionally recognized preferential option for
the poor, requires both a more specific and detailed presentation of
the "positive" constitution such a preference implies, and
recognition of the limited competence of the Court.
X.

POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

In a new book Welfare and the Constitution, Sotirios Barber
presents a compelling case for viewing the Constitution as a
charter of positive benefits requiring balance rather than a charter
of negative liberties requiring checking."0 He summarizes the
negative-liberties model of the Constitution as
Assum[ing] that, for better or worse, the Constitution leaves
government's provision of goods and services, from national defense
to pensions and schools, to the play of pluralist political forces
represented by elected officials whose decisions are legally restricted
solely by judicially declared fundamental rights and structural
principles ... it guarantees exemptions from governmental action,
not rights to governmental benefits. It imposes no unconditional
duty to provide, and therefore it guarantees no right to any
substantive benefit beyond access to the system of interest
representation."'
As a consequence of this constricted view of government it has
been held by courts and scholars, that there is no "unconditional
federal constitutional duty to provide any substantive benefit to
anyone-no constitutional duty to provide police protection, for
example, even to a child of four against the reasonably predictable,
because repeated, violence of a disturbed parent."82 This is a
reference to De Shaney v. Winnebago (the Dred Scott case of the
twentieth century). Barber further refers to lower federal court
opinions finding no constitutional right to police or fire
protection.m
In other words, the Constitution does not even
require the nightwatchman state that even libertarians favor. If
that is the case, just what does the Constitution do? As Barber
argues, even Hobbes imposes the minimum duty to provide people
with security from private violence.' So let us put the negative

79. See, e.g., Frank J. Michelman, Democracy Based Resistance to a
Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1893 (2001).
80. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).

81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at xii.

83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 26-28. There is language in Supreme Court opinions revealing a
sense that passivity in the face of wrong is inconsistent with good government.
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liberties view aside as another non-functional, even dysfunctional,
system.
Barber outlines the framework of government set forth in The
Federalist as an historic or originalist argument that the
Constitution properly understood obliges government to
affirmatively pursue the well-being of all responsible persons.
He argues: "The Federalist generally reflects
the
instrumentalist or ends-oriented language and logic of the
Constitution's Preamble." 5 These ends are described by Publius
variously as "the solid happiness of the people," "the real welfare
of the great body of the people," "Justice," and "the public good."8
Thus, "Publius's overriding concern for the ends of government
brings him to an understanding of governmental powers" that
finds not just "mere authorizations but a fiduciary duty to pursue
the ends for which the powers were granted in the first place."87
In a more philosophic vein Barber argues that all government
action (or inaction) is redistributive to some one or another. That
is, it is non-neutral. This is consistent with the causation analysis
underlying Coase's theorem. He cites both critics and supporters
of the welfare state for the proposition that "all acts of government
are either immediately redistributive or protective of prior
redistributive acts."'
He further argues that a categorical
distinction between state action and private action is "belie(d)" by
the reality that permitting something (slavery or abortion are his
examples) is "tantamount to protecting it by enforcing the criminal
and civil laws against those who cannot stop it save by unlawful or
tortious behavior."89
Robin West reaches a similar conclusion on the basis of the
text of the fourteenth amendment. She focuses on the words that
are relied on to require "state action" and argues rather than
prohibit just irrational state action, they equally prohibit "state
inaction in the face of private power".9"
The words are "no state shall deny. . ." West says "deny"
should be understood as including "fail," or "refuse," or "neglect" to
take action. To deny is to not give. In these terms then the
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (stating "[tihe
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government
of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right"); Ward
v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920) (stating that "this court has said on
several occasions, 'the obligation to do justice rests upon all persons, natural

and artificial").
85. BARBER, supra note 80, at 39.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 52-53.

90. West, supra note 71, at 3.
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Constitution requires affirmative governmental action in the face
of unacceptable private conduct. 91 She reminds us that the Civil
Rights Cases in fact assumed there was a governmental remedy
for the wrongs in those cases, most probably in a form related to
the common law duty to serve imposed on certain businesses.9"
Importantly in this regard, recent scholarship has shown that
in the nineteenth century governments have acted positively to
protect people from abuses of private power, and to promote the
people's welfare. In the words of William Novak, "It was an epoch
in which strong common law notions of public prerogatives and the
duties and obligations of government persisted amid a torrent of
private adjudication and constitution writing."93
XI. BUT CAN IT BE DONE?
What of the limited competence of the Court to determine
social needs, to set priorities, and evaluate the distributive
consequences of decisions according a preferential option for the
poor?94
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883).
93. WILLIAM J. NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (1996). See generally QUENTIN SKINNER,
LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998) (providing historic background of the

view that a state is obligated to free its citizens from exploitation and
dependence).
94. One preliminary aspect of the problem that has received scant attention
is the judicial oath of office. Each judge solemnly swears or affirms that he or
she will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to
the poor and the rich. The judges also swear to faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon them according to the
best of their abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and
laws of the United States. They end by invoking God's help.
These words go back to Deuteronomy and Leviticus of the Jewish Bible.
Deuteronomy 1:16-17 charges the judges to:
You must give your brothers a fair hearing and see justice done between
a man and his brother or the stranger who lives with him. You must be
impartial in judgment and give and equal hearing to small and great
alike. Do not be afraid of any man, for the judgment is God's. Should a
case be too difficult, bring it to me and I will hear it.
The Jerusalem Bible, Reader's Edition. Leviticus 19:15 is more succinct but to
the same effect: "You must not be guilty of unjust verdicts. You must neither
be partial to the little man nor overawed by the great; you must pass judgment
on your neighbor according to justice." The Jerusalem Bible, Reader's Edition.
On its face oath seems to preclude a preferential option for the poor.
But especially in the Biblical context it is clear that the core meaning of the
oath is otherwise. The message is that the stranger or exile is a neighbor, and
the poor and the rich are equal. Deuteronomy makes it clear that if all that is
too difficult to understand, God will handle it. That is because the criteria for
judging is righteousness, an attribute of God.
In more secular terms, the oath requires constant awareness of the
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Sotirius Barber frankly acknowledges the "bad news" this
question implies. Barber agrees, "the complex, contingent, and
unpredictable character of policies for facilitating any conception
of well-being, together with the time-sensitive balance of needs
involved in concrete funding decision-and the ultimate need for
public support-place most of the responsibility on legislators and
their voting constituents.""
Is that the end? Must we return the poor to outside the door?
I think not!
Certainly empirically oriented studies like Rosenberg's The
Hollow Hope," and Powers and Rothman's The Least Dangerous
97
Branch?
demand judicial restraint.
Judicial overreaching
through imposed remedies has contributed to constitutional
ossification and actually hurt intended beneficiaries in many
instances.
But the Courts also need a dose of humility especially under
the preferential option for the poor principle in judging the facts of
a case. The other Justice Marshall regularly insisted that the
Court recognize the "reality" of the lived experience of the poor.
He considered the gory details of trial records in the light of his
own experience and saw things the other Justices would overlook,
misunderstand, or undervalue. For instance in Illinois v. Perkins,
the majority had characterized the questioning by the police of a
prisoner as a "conversation." Justice Marshall quoted from the
actual transcript and recharacterized it as an "interrogation"
requiring Mirandawarnings.98
More directly, dissenting in U.S. v. Kras which found the
imposition of filing fee for petitioning the bankruptcy court
constitutional, he wrote "no one who has had close contact with
poor people can fail to understand how close to the margins of
survival many of them are."' His "most impassioned statements
came in cases dealing with the governments role in regulating the
lives of poor people." 100

presence of the poor. It requires that all rules "do equal right" to the poor and

the rich without partiality. To the extent the poor are by definition less well
off economically, the oath can be seen as a commitment or command to level
up, rather than level down so to speak. Do not deny the rich what is theirs by
right; but make sure the poor actually receive equal right without regard to
their poverty. So rather than an impediment, the Judicial oath can be seen as
requiring a preferential option for the poor.
95. BARBER, supra note 80, at 152.
96. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
97. STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH?: CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2002).

98. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 305 (1990).
99. U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973).
100. TUSHNET, supra note 77, at 103.
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The first verse of Robert Conquest's poem of praise for George
Orwell captures the power and effect of Thurgood Marshall.
Moral and mental glaciers melting slightly
Betray the influence of his warm intent.
Because he taught us what the actual meant 101
The vicious winter grips its prey less tightly.
Rather than returning to ideologic determination of "facts"
that Justice Peckam manifest in describing the working conditions
in bakeries, 0 ' and as the Court has done in recent cases, especially
Board of Trustees v. Garrett 3 where they turned a long history of
oppression, forced dependence, and segregation, and lack of
treatment into a finding of deep, long standing care and concern.
Rather than viewing leftovers, the crumbs of conscience from the
majority, as proof of the power of the recipients, as some Justices
did, the inequality should be seen for what it is." In the words of
Justice Thurgood Marshall "it is perfectly proper for judges to
disagree about what the Constitution requires.
But it is
disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised
upon unfounded assumptions about how people live."0 5 In another
opinion he characterized this factual determination of the majority
as "callous indifference to the realities of the life for the poor. " "
Recognizing these empiric and epistemologic dangers Barber
reluctantly concludes that "a specification of benefits may fall
short of the general welfare or eventually even defeat it... some
may even have reservations about specifying a general right of
responsible persons actually to enjoy the minimum necessities of a
decent life." He does however allow 1for
a "right ...to dutiful effort
7
and progress" from the government.
Roberto Gargarella in his Fiss e-symposium article concludes
that there ultimately is no way to make this happen. He opts
finally for presence or "voice," by providing that subordinated
groups have a member on the Court.0
Despite the value of
focusing on voice, this specific suggestion seems a reflection of all
that is wrong with identity politics.
In the world of "imperfect alternatives" Neil Komesar urges a
return to a Madisonian, even Harringtonian, focus on institutions

101.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, WHY ORWELL MAT1ERS

1 (2002) (quoting

Robert Conquest).
102. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
103. Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
104. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial
Review: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2001).
105. Kras, 409 U.S. at 460.
106. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
107. BARBER, supra note 80, at 57.
108. Roberto Gargarella, Group Rights, Judicial Review, and "Personal
Motives" (Fiss e-symposium Article 3).
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and structures. 9 One need not agree with Komesar's specifics to
recognize the practical wisdom in his approach.
So what can the Court do? In addition to its traditional
"checking" role, the Court can recognize that each of the systems
of the society is "imperfect" and it can adopt the "balancing" role
proposed here. But how would that work?
In eleventh amendment cases'1 ' and in the early debate about
Supreme Court review of state court decisions11 the Court has
relied at least in part on the "good faith" of other branches of
government, rather than ordering them to do or not to something.
Judicial opinions are crafted to influence behavior beyond that
required by the Court's order in a particular case. The Court can
more forcefully nudge decision-makers to a preferential option for
the poor.
Further beyond hope and a friendly nudge now and again,
there are cases like Kadrmas and Garrettwhere just the slightest
sensitivity to reality, to say nothing of a preferential option, would
lead to results different than under current law.
To actualize what might otherwise remain unanswered hope,
an unfelt nudge, or insensitivity to facts, Courts could require
Congress and agencies to manifest their consideration of the
interests and needs of the poor. While the experience of the
Courts with "impact" statements and cost-benefit analysis is not
all positive; clearly some of it has been efficacious."' Professor
Michelman has referred to the feasibility of "judicial mandate(s) to
legislative, executive, or administrative officers to prepare,
submit, and carry out.., corrective plan(s).""'
Finally, scholars like Susan Sturm have begun to suggest
ways for courts to develop this balancing role by focusing "on
developing the institutional competence of [itself and] other actors
to pursue equality norms." She articulates something like the
"balancing" role of the Court being proposed when she says, "The
judiciary becomes involved when... there is a strong indication
that particular systems and practices are failing in ways that fall

109. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 38.
110. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (writing "The good faith of
the States thus provides an important assurance that" the Constitution and
federal law will be complied with).
111. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816)
(stating "We have not thought it incumbent on us to give any opinion upon the
question whether this Court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus...
to enforce the former judgments").
112. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & PETER M.
SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM-CASES
AND MATERIALS 160-68 (4th ed. 1998).
113. Frank J. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 902, 1006 (1973).
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within the purview of generally articulated equality aspirations.'. 4
The experiences of Courts I have mentioned and the
scholarship of Komesar and Sturm and others suggest the
feasibility of an approach combining an opening up of the other
imperfect institutions to the voice of the poor, some feasible form
of poor people's impact statement, and shifting burdens like in
pre-emptory juror challenge cases.
This "preference" will (help) balance the working of politicaleconomic systems of society by insuring that the plight of the poor
is both visible and recognized as a necessary consideration in
governmental decision-making.
It will also increase the
inclusiveness and effectiveness of the American Dream machine
that judicial review was to Chief Justice Marshall in this
imperfect world of ours.

114. Susan Sturm, Owen Fiss, Equality Theory, and Judicial Role (Fiss esymposium Article 18) at 7.

